| The Agency Dilemma: Information Asymmetry
in the “Principal-Agent” Problem | Agencijska dilema: Informaciona asimetrija u problemu „poslodavac-unajmljenik” |
| Management, [pdf] | Menadžment, [pdf] |
| ID: 7.2012.62.2 Number: 62 Year: 2012 UDC: 005.336.5:005.57 ; 659.23 ; 519.83:659.21 [tmx] [bow] |
Milena Popović
Institution: Faculty of Organizational Sciences, University of Belgrade | Milena Popović
Institucija: Fakultet organizacionih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu |
Marija Kuzmanović
Institution: Faculty of Organizational Sciences, University of Belgrade | Marija Kuzmanović
Institucija: Fakultet organizacionih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu |
Bisera Andrić Gušavac
Institution: Faculty of Organizational Sciences, University of Belgrade | Bisera Andrić Gušavac
Institucija: Fakultet organizacionih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu |
Abstract
By possessing incomplete and imperfect information, market participants do not achieve the optimal allocation of
resources that would be possible in the case of possessing complete information. On the other hand, timely and
relevant information represents a product for which the appropriate market price must be paid. In modern corporations,
the two sides engaged in a contract may have different goals and have different levels of information.
This problem is called the “principal-agent” problem. Agents sometimes have personal goals that do not coincide
with the goals of the principal, thus the principal must achieve its own, but also the needs of agents. One way is
to motivate the agent using rewards, prohibitions and penalties. In this case, the qualitative needs assessment and
evaluation of costs results in greater efficiency and faster problem solving. The paper points out the importance
of economics of information for the operation and the result of market processes. To model market relations in a
situation where two parties are asymmetrically informed, the methodology of game theory is used. The problem of “ principal-agent “ is modelled as the Bayesian game, where the solution is obtained using the concept of the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. | Apstrakt
Posedovanjem nepotpunih i nesavršenih informacija, ucesnici na tržištu ne ostvaruju optimalnu alokaciju resursa koja bi bila moguca u slucaju potpune informisanosti. S druge strane, blagovremena i relevantna informacija predstavlja proizvod za koji mora da se plati odgovarajuca tržišna cena. U savremenim korporacijama dve strane angažovane u nekom ugovoru, mogu imati razlicite ciljeve i posedovati razlicit nivo informacija. Ovaj problem poznat je pod nazivom problem “poslodavac-unajmljenik“. Unajmljenici ponekad imaju licne ciljeve koji se ne podudaraju sa ciljevima poslodavca, pa je poslodavac taj koji mora da zadovolji sopstvene, ali i potrebe unajmljenika. Jedan od nacina je i da unajmljenika motiviše nagradama, zabranama i kaznama. U ovom slucaju, kvalitativna ocena potreba i procena troškova dovodi po povecanja efikasnosti i bržeg reša-vanja problema. U ovom radu ukazano je na znacaj ekonomije informacija za funkcionisanje i rezultat tržišnih procesa. Za modeliranje tržišnih odnosa u uslovima kada su strane asimetricno informisane, korišcena je metodologija teorije igara. Problem “poslodavac-unajmljenik“ modeliran je kao Bajesova ekstenzivna igra, a rešenje je dobijeno primenom koncepta Bajes-Nešovog ekvilibrijuma. |
| Pages: 13-21 | Strane: 13-21 |